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Abstract: Timing plays a crucial role in the context of information security investments: We regard 
timing in two dimensions, namely the time of announcement in relation to the time of investment 
and the time of announcement in relation to the time of a fundamental security incident. The 
financial value of information security investments is assessed by examining the relationship 
between the investment announcements and their stock market reaction focusing on the two time 
dimensions. Using an event study methodology, we found that both dimensions influence the stock 
market return of the investing organization. In particular: (1) after fundamental security incidents 
in a given industry, the stock price will react more positively to a firm’s announcement of actual 
information security investments than to announcements of the intention to invest; (2) the stock 
price will react more positively to a firm’s announcements of the intention to invest after the 
fundamental security incident compared to before; and (3) the stock price will react more 
positively to a firm’s announcements of actual information security investments after the 
fundamental security incident compared to before. Overall, the lowest abnormal return can be 
expected when the intention to invest is announced before a fundamental information security 
incident and the highest return when actual investing after a fundamental information security 
incident in the respective industry.  
Keywords: Event Study, Information Security, Investment Announcements, Stock Price Reaction, 
Value of Information Security Investments 
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1. Introduction  
As companies increasingly rely on technology to conduct their everyday business operations and 
deploy business strategies (Kankanhalli, Teo, Tan, & Wei, 2003), the frequency and severity of 
corporate cyber-attacks and security breaches increased and therefore information security has 
become a crucial concern for organizations. According to Forbes, the number of leaked records in 
the first half of 2017 is already higher than the number for all of 2016. Moreover, with over 4 
billion, the number of records exposed in 2016 was already more than double that the amount  of 
both previous years combined (Forbes, 2017). To protect a firm’s valuable data and assets against 
these security incidents, organizations implement physical, technical or administrative security 
measures accordingly. With publicly announcing these information security investments, firms 
illustrate their ambition to provide their customers and partner firms with secure products and 
services. However, when it comes to information security investment announcements1, timing 
plays a crucial role (Gordon & Loeb, 2002; Tatsumi & Goto, 2010; Xu, Luo, Zhang, Liu, & Huang, 
2017): Firms need to decide whether to make the announcement before the investment, i.e., to 
announce the intention to invest in the near future or after the investment, i.e., to announce the 
actual investment. Studying the implications of firms’ announcements of intended information 
security investments is beneficial for the following reason: With announcing the intention to invest 
and to implement information security countermeasures, firms may achieve a fast and immediate 
positive stock market return. However, the organization also discloses that it has not yet 
implemented that particular security countermeasure, therefore revealing a weakness and possibly 
open themselves to being attacked. Accordingly, an organization needs to carefully consider 
whether to pre-announce information security investments. Our study proposes that the a firm’s 
                                                          
1
 An announcement is defined as “information supplied to the market, typically published in the press, by the 
managers of the firm” (Dos Santos et al. 1993, p. 21).  
Event Study on the Impact of Information Security Investment Announcements 
 
Frei verwendbar  3 
 
stock market value varies dependent on whether the announcement was before or after the actual 
investment, i.e., whether the firm announces their intention to invest or the actual investment.  
Apart from the first dimension which focusses on examining the stock market reactions to 
announcements prior to investments and announcements after the investment, we analyse the 
stock market reactions to announcements prior to a fundamental security incident in a given 
industry and after. We strive to understand the effects of fundamental security incidents on the 
stock market’s behaviour towards information security investment announcements. Research in 
this area is of particular importance for the following reason: Major security incidents such as the 
Yahoo hack in 2013, compromising 1.5 billion users’ real names, email addresses and telephone 
numbers, attracted global attention and reinforced security fear among firms as well as individuals 
(Forbes, 2013). After this major security incident an organization’s announcement to invest in 
information security in order to increase the security level and to minimize the risk of successful 
breaches and attacks enhances the confidence and trust of consumers and users in the investing 
firm. Therefore, we assume a different stock market reaction to a firm’s announcement of security 
investments after and before a fundamental security incident. In this study, we regard different 
specific fundamental security incidents concerning various industries and compare the effect of 
information security investment announcements from firms of a given industry before and after an  
incident.  
Overall, we regard timing in two dimensions, namely the time of announcement in relation to the 
time of investment and the time of announcement in relation to the time of a fundamental security 
incident. Thus, the first dimension deals with an endogenous phenomenon, since the organization 
is able to influence the time of announcement relative to the time of investment. The second 
dimension covers an exogenous phenomenon, since the firm cannot control the time of security 
incidents. For each time dimension we pose a research question (RQ): 
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RQ1: How do a firm’s announcement of an information security investment intention and an 
announcement of an actual information security investment influence the firm’s stock market 
value? 
RQ2: How do a firm’s announcement of an information security investment influence the firm’s 
stock market value before a fundamental security incident and after the incident? 
We examine the interplay between the endogenous and exogenous time dimension regarding 
information security investments, i.e., we study whether there is a correlation between the two 
research questions. For organizations, research in this area is of particular importance since it aids 
in the determination of the optimal point in time to invest in information security 
countermeasures.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: In the next section we provide an overview of 
related work. Section 3 describes the hypotheses development. Subsequently follows the 
description of the research methodology we used in our event study. In Section 5 we present the 
results which are discussed thereafter. Moreover, managerial implications are described. The 
concluding section summarizes this work.  
2. Related Work  
Academic work in the field of management information systems analysing the impact of security-
related events on the market value of firms can be classified into two categories (Chai, Kim, & Rao, 
2011): (1) research focusing on the (negative) stock market impact resulting from information 
security breaches, incidents and vulnerabilities, and (2) research on the (positive) stock market 
impact caused by information security investments. Our study can be assigned to the second 
category.  
Literature in the first category is numerous, focusing on IS breaches (Cavusoglu, Mishra, & 
Raghunathan, 2004; Garg, Curtis, & Halper, 2003; Gatzlaff & McCullough, 2010; Goel & Shawky, 
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2009; Pirounias, Mermigas, & Patsakis, 2014; T. Wang, Ulmer, & Kannan, 2013), loss of confidential 
data (Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, & Zhou, 2003), denial of service attacks (Hovav & D’Arcy, 2003), 
virus attacks (Hovav & D’Arcy, 2004; J. Wang, Xiao, & Rao, 2010), spam (Böhme & Holz, 2006; 
Bouraoui, 2009; Frieder & Zittrain, 2007), and privacy violations (Acquisti, Friedman, & Telang, 
2006). Moreover, the impact of information security breaches on the non-breached competitors 
has been studied (Aytes, Byers, & Santhanakrishnan, 2006; Zafar, Ko, & Osei-Bryson, 2012). 
Generally, there are two main sources for information on the occurrence of security breaches: 
First, there are newspaper articles covering a firm’s public announcement of a breach (Acquisti et 
al., 2006; Campbell et al., 2003; Cavusoglu et al., 2004; Goel & Shawky, 2009; Hovav & D’Arcy, 
2003, 2004; Hovav & D’arcy, 2005); and second, there are various archives such as the Richardson’s 
Stock Spam Effectiveness Monitor (Böhme & Holz, 2006; Bouraoui, 2009) from which reports can 
be downloaded. A detailed literature review on the impact of information security breaches on the 
stock market can be found in Böhme & Holz (2006) and Spanos & Angelis (2016).  
The second category deals with the effects of information security investment events on the 
market. As a source of information, information security investment announcements from 
newspapers have been used (Bose & Leung, 2013; Brock & Levy, 2013; Chai et al., 2011; Jeong, 
Jeong, & Lee, 2016). In Table 1, literature on information security investment effects on the stock 
market is summarized.  
Table 1 Research of Effects of Information Security Investments on Stock Market 
Article Research Focus Key Findings 
Chai (2011) Value of invest-
ments in IT 
security 
 
- IT security investment announcements lead to positive 
abnormal returns for firms. 
- Security investments show higher abnormal returns 
after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) than before. 
Jeong (2016) Spillover value of 
investments in IT 
security 
- IT security investment has negative effects on 
competitive firms’ stock market values. 
- After the enactment of the Personal Information 
Protection Act, the competitors’ stock market values 
respond more negatively to a security investment 
announcement than before the enactment. 
Brock (2013) Value of e-banking - E-banking firms making IT security investment 
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investments in IT 
security 
announcements experience statistically significant 
market reactions. 
Bose (2013) Value of imple-
menting identity 
theft counter-
measures 
- Announcing the adoption of identity theft 
countermeasures increases the short-term market value 
of the announcing firm.  
- Early adopters, adopters of sophisticated identity theft 
countermeasures, firms with high growth potential, and 
firms with high credit rating experience a strong and 
positive return in market value, whereas small firms 
undergo a moderate positive reaction. 
Xu (2017) Value of proactive 
and reactive IT 
security invest-
ments 
- Proactive IT security investments for commercial 
exploitation increases stock market return 
- Reactive IT security investments for IT security 
improvement lead to higher returns than a commercial 
exploitation strategy  
While the negative financial impact of security-related events such as security breaches, attacks, 
and vulnerabilities was mainly advocated in academic literature (Acquisti et al., 2006; Campbell et 
al., 2003; Cavusoglu et al., 2004; Garg et al., 2003), an understanding of the positive financial 
impact resulting from information security investments is rarely analysed (Bose & Leung, 2013; 
Brock & Levy, 2013). According to various research studies, information security investments have 
a positive influence on the stock market value of the investing firm (Bose & Leung, 2013; Brock & 
Levy, 2013; Chai et al., 2011). The stock market’s reaction to various types of information security 
investments has been regarded, e.g., investments in identity theft countermeasures or investments 
with commercial exploitation (Bose & Leung, 2013; Chai et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2017). However, to 
the best of our knowledge, neither a distinction between intended and actual investments has 
been made, nor has the difference between announcements of intended and actual investments in 
terms of the impact on the stock market been analysed yet. This is true for both general IT 
investments as well as information security investments. Moreover, although existing academic 
research examined the stock market behaviour before and after the enactment of certain acts 
(Chai et al., 2011; Jeong et al., 2016), the stock market behaviour on information security 
investment announcements before and after fundamental security incidents has not been 
considered yet.  
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3. Hypotheses Development  
In order to examine both RQ1 and RQ2, we analyse and compare the effects of four cases: (1) 
announcements of information security investment intentions before fundamental security 
incidents on the stock prize, (2) announcements of actual information security investments before 
fundamental security incidents on the stock prize, (3) announcements of information security 
investment intentions after fundamental security incidents on the stock prize and (4) 
announcements of actual information security investments after fundamental security incidents on 
the stock prize. With comparing these four cases, we obtain four hypotheses which are developed 
in the following and depicted in Figure 1. In this study an organization’s information security 
investment is categorized as intended investment if the organization announces its plans to 
implement a specific information security measure in the future, i.e., the measure has not been 
implemented up to the time of the announcement. On the other hand, if the firm publicly 
announces that it has successfully completed the implementation of an information security 
measure, i.e., if the security measure has been realized before the announcement, we categorize 
this announcement as an actual investment.  
3.1. Comparison of Announcements of Actual Information Security Investments and Intentions 
Publicly announcing the intention to commit to certain changes is common practice in some 
markets such as the airline industry and the chemical market (Achy & Joekes, 2016; Besanko, 
Dranove, Shanley, & Schaefer, 2009). Often, price changes or changes in the availability of products 
are pre-announced, i.e., they are announced before being put into practice (Achy & Joekes, 2016). 
Reasons for price announcements in advance are to inform shareholders and customers, reduce 
the uncertainty that competitors will not follow, or to renege on price changes that competitors 
reject to follow (Besanko et al., 2009; Smith, 2011). Accordingly, announcing the intention to 
implement specific actions and changes is strategically used by firms to observe customers’ and 
competitors’ reactions before actually implementing any alterations. In the context of information 
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security investments, organizations frequently pre-announce the investments to gain strategic 
advantages or to attract customers with improved security systems. In this study we compare the 
effect of intended and actual information security investment announcements and hypothesize 
that compared to actual information security investment announcements, an intended information 
security investment announcement triggers a more negative stock market reaction; since an 
investment will be in the future, doubts whether the promised investment will be made persist. 
Moreover, with announcing information security investment intentions, a firm admits that 
imperfections regarding information security subsist and that there is potential for improvement. 
Accordingly, the announcing organization concedes that there are security vulnerabilities or 
weaknesses which will be fixed in the future but which are currently existent. In contrast, when a 
firm announces actual information security investments, the customers’ and users’ trust in the 
organization, its services and products increases because of knowing that the firm’s security level is 
now higher than before and security incidents are less likely. We assume that this positive stock 
prize reaction to an organization’s investment announcement occurs independently of the time of 
announcement, i.e., before and after a fundamental security incident. We thus derive the following 
two hypotheses:  
H1: Before fundamental security incidents, the stock price will react more positively to a firm’s 
announcement of actual information security investments than to announcements of the intention 
to invest. 
H2: After fundamental security incidents, the stock price will react more positively to a firm’s 
announcement of actual information security investments than to announcements of the intention 
to invest. 
3.2. Comparison of Announcements of Information Security Investments before and after 
fundamental security incident 
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Prior research studied information transfer in the context of information security, i.e., studies 
examined how a security incident in one firm affects the stock market prices of other firms 
(Ettredge & Richardson, 2003). This effect can be negative (contagion effect) or positive 
(competition effect) (Laux, Starks, & Yoon, 1998). Research showed that organizations which were 
not actually attacked experienced negative stock return at the time when an organization in the 
same industry was attacked (Ettredge & Richardson, 2003). We deduce that a security incident 
affecting one organization has an impact on the whole industry. Accordingly, we hypothesize that a 
fundamental security incident affects the corresponding industry in such a way that a security 
investment announcement after the incident causes a more positive stock return than before the 
incident. Consider the following scenario: After fundamental security incidents which have been 
publicly discussed and have caused a stir, investors’ focus shifts to security considerations; realizing 
the extensive consequences of the security incident, investors may put more emphasis on security 
concerns in that industry than before the incident. Consequently, firms’ information security 
investment announcements cause a more positive stock market return after a fundamental 
security incident in the corresponding industry than before, when security was considered less 
important and necessary. In order to prevent inconsistencies and overlaps with other fundamental 
security incidents, we separately regard various major security incidents concerning different 
industries. Accordingly, we consider different industry-specific fundamental security incidents. We 
hypothesize that after these incidents in the respective industry, information security and privacy 
concerns shift in the focus of investors’ attention and therefore their reaction to information 
security investment announcements, whether intended or actual, is assumed to be considerably 
more positive than before the incident. Thus, we pose the following hypotheses: 
H3: The stock price will react more positively to a firm’s announcement of the intention to invest 
after a fundamental security incident compared to before.  
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H4: The stock price will react more positively to a firm’s announcement of actual information 
security investments after a fundamental security incident compared to before. 
Figure 1 presents the four hypotheses in a summarized form.  
 
Figure 1 Presentation of the four Hypotheses 
4. Research Methodology 
This study uses an event methodology approach to investigate how market investors react to two 
types of information security investment announcements, i.e., actual and intended investments, 
before a fundamental security incident and after. The event study methodology is based on the 
efficient market theory, which states that when new information about an organization is publicly 
available, it is instantly absorbed by investors and incorporated into stock prices (Garg et al., 2003; 
Mortanges & Rad, 1998). Thus, changes in stock prices reflect the impact of the new information 
provided on current and future firm performance (Garg et al., 2003). An event study, commonly 
used in accounting and finance literature (Dos Santos, Peffers, & Mauer, 1993), is a suitable 
research method for studying the effects of public event announcements on stock prices since an 
immediate market response represents the expectations of investors towards a firm's future 
performance based on the current corporate actions (Bose & Leung, 2013). Event studies are 
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widely used in academic literature to examine the relationship between an IT-related event and its 
impact on an organization’s value (Bose & Leung, 2013; Campbell et al., 2003; Cavusoglu et al., 
2004; Chai et al., 2011; Chatterjee & Carl Pacini, 2002; Ranganathan, Ye, & Jha, 2013). 
 
4.1. Sample 
We collected information security investment announcements by electronically searching the 
Lexis/Nexis Academic Database using the search terms “information security”, “security 
implementation”, and “today announce” covering the time period from 2000 to 2017. The 
elimination of announcements from private companies and non-listed public companies, whose 
stock returns cannot be assessed, as well as the exclusion of announcements which do not clearly 
state whether the investment has already been made or not, resulted in a sample consisting 63 
newspaper articles about information security announcements, i.e. we regard 63 investment 
announcements. Table 3 shows the distribution of our sample and Table 4 lists selected examples 
of information security announcements from our sample. The fundamental security incidents were 
extracted from breachlevelindex.com, an online database documenting data breach statistics 
based on publicly disclosed, worldwide security incidents. We acknowledge that security incidents 
occur on a daily basis. Therefore, we focus on fundamental breaches in various sectors of industry: 
We chose security incidents with the highest possible risk score of 10.0, i.e., breaches with an 
immense long-term impact and large amounts of highly sensitive information lost. Table 2 shows 
details on three exemplary incidents. 
Table 2 Details on the Fundamental Security Incidents according to breachlevelindex.com 
Breached Firm Date of Breach Industry Risk Score 
Equifax 07/15/17 Financial 10.0 
Friend Finder Networks 10/16/16 Service 10.0 
eBay 05/21/14 Retail 10.0 
We determined a firm’s size according to the total number of employees at the time of the 
investment announcement (Size) (Arthur, 2003; Ranganathan et al., 2013) c.f. Table 3. The 
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industries of the announcing organizations were ascertained using their 4-digit SIC codes and were 
grouped into three industry types (Industry). To obtain historical data from the stock market we 
used Alpha Vantage, which offers APIs in a CSV format for real-time and historical stock data. 
Whether the investment is intended or actual (Status), and whether the type of security measure is 
human, technological or a certification (Measure) was extracted from the announcement articles. 
The date of announcement stipulates whether the announcement of a firm was made before or 
after the security incident has occurred in a given firm’s industry (Incident).  
Table 3 Distribution of the Sample 
St
a
tu
s Status of the announcement 
intended 22 announcements i.e., 34.9% 
actual  41 announcements i.e., 65.1% 
In
ci
d
en
t Before/after security incident in particular industry 
before the incident 49 announcements i.e., 77.8% 
after the incident 14 announcements i.e., 22.2% 
M
ea
su
re
 Security measure the announcement refers to  
human 28 announcements i.e., 44.4% 
technological 12 announcements i.e., 19.0% 
certification 23 announcements i.e., 36.6% 
Si
ze
 
Firm size of announcing firm   
small 21 announcements i.e., 33.3% 
medium 23 announcements i.e., 36.5% 
large 19 announcements i.e., 30.2% 
In
d
u
st
ry
 Industry of announcing firm  
Retail 6 announcements i.e., 9.5% 
Service 39 announcements i.e., 61.9% 
Financial 18 announcements i.e., 28.6% 
Table 4 Examples of Announcements used in the Event Study Analysis 
Company Excerpt from Announcements Type 
Zoho   Zoho Corp. announced today that it has been awarded the ISO/IEC 
27001:2013 certificate. 
actual 
KDDI Check Point Software Technologies Ltd., […], today announced KDDI, 
[…], will incorporate Check Point VPN-1/FireWall-1(R) and Provider-
1(R) into its new managed security service.  
intended 
Humana Network Associates, Inc., the leading provider of intrusion prevention 
solutions, today announced that Humana Inc. has selected McAfee(R) 
ePolicy Orchestrator(R) (ePO(TM)) 3.0. 
actual 
Royal 
Caribbean 
Cruises 
Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. today announced the appointment of 
Renee Guttman as Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), effective 
January 25, 2016.   
intended 
SEEK Imperva, Inc., […], announced today that SEEK Limited has 
implemented Imperva SecureSphere Web Application Firewall (WAF). 
actual  
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4.2. Statistical Methodology  
In order to determine the impact of the investment announcements, we first estimate the stock 
return as if the announcement had not happened by means of an estimation window. To compute 
the expected return, we use the market model which is originally suggested by Markowitz (1968). 
The market model is a statistical model which links a firm’s stock market return to the market index 
in order to form conditional predicted portfolio returns (Pettit & Westerfield, 1974). It is the most 
common approach to estimate expected returns according to Bose & Leung (2013) and Dos Santos 
et al. (1993). It has been stated that simple models such as the market model are to be well 
specified and effective (Bouraoui, 2009). The market model is based on the assumption that there 
is a linear relation between the stock market return of each firm and the return of the market 
index. Accordingly, the return 𝑅𝑖𝑡  for firm 𝑖 on day 𝑡 can be expressed as a linear function:  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 .      (1) 
In this study, the return 𝑅𝑖𝑡  is computed from the stock prices obtained from Alpha Vantage 
(alphavantage.co) as the relative increase of the stock price over the price of the previous day; 
thus, we compute 𝑅𝑖𝑡  by  𝑅𝑖𝑡: =  
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)
. Furthermore, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the return for the market on 
day 𝑡 for which we used the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 index as done in prior event studies 
(Bose & Leung, 2013; Hovav & D’Arcy, 2003; Hovav & D’arcy, 2005). The parameters  𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are 
the market model y-intercept and slope parameters for firm 𝑖, and 𝜖𝑖𝑡   is the disturbance term with 
ordinary least squares (OLS) properties2.  
For our study, we regard two windows, namely the estimation window and the event window as 
depicted in Figure 2. The estimation window is a time period with no event and is used to estimate the 
expected return. By contrast, the event window is a time period in which an event occurs and is used to 
calculate the abnormal returns. The two windows do not overlap. We set the event window for three 
                                                          
2
 𝐸(𝜖𝑖𝑡) = 0, 𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝜖𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎𝜖𝑖
2 .  
Event Study on the Impact of Information Security Investment Announcements 
 
Frei verwendbar  14 
 
days: the day prior to the announcement (𝑡 = −1), the day of the announcement (𝑡 = 0) and the 
day after (𝑡 = 1) as suggested by Dos Santos et al. (1993), Im, Dow, & Grover (2001), and 
Ranganathan et al. (2013). By including the day before the announcement, we capture market 
reactions caused by information leakage (Campbell et al., 2003). As an estimation window prior to the 
event we use the interval starting 122 days and ending 2 days before the event day as 
recommended in the literature (Campbell et al., 2003). Therefore, we use a discrete estimation 
window 𝑇 = [−122, −2], 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 of 121 actual trading days.  
 
Figure 2 Timeline of Estimation and Event Window 
The firm-dependent coefficients 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 from the market model (1) are estimated over the 
estimation window using linear regression, i.e., using data from before the event window; we 
estimate the expected returns and calculate what the normal returns would be at the day of the 
event for each event. With using data from before the event window we guarantee that the event 
does not distort the estimation of the expected returns. The estimated parameters “remain fairly 
constant over long periods of time, e.g., the entire post-World War II period” (Fama, Fisher, Jensen, 
& Roll, 1969, p. 403). This statement was backed up by the results on beta stationarity from Binder 
(1998), Blume (1971), and Lee & Wu (1985).  
To determine the extent to which realized returns differ from expected returns due to investors’ 
reactions to the announcement, we compute the abnormal rate of return 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  for each day in the 
event window and for each event as follows 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (?̃?𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡),       (2) 
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Thus, the abnormal return is the difference between the actual and the predicted return. Hereby, 
?̃?𝑖 and ?̃?𝑖 are the parameter estimates obtained by the regression of the market model (1) over the 
121-day estimation window. To study the period surrounding the event date, we determine the 
cumulated abnormal return (CAR) over our three-day discrete event window 𝑇 = [−1,1], 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 as 
the sum of the abnormal returns: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 .
1
𝑡=−1       (3) 
The average CAR for all events in the sample is computed with  
𝐶𝐴𝑅 =  
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖  ,
𝑁
𝑖=1      (4)  
where 𝑁 is the number of events in the sample. 
We follow the approach of Chai et al. (2011) and examine influences caused by a firm’s industry, 
size, or the implemented security measure on stock market return. To assess the impact of the 
variables on the 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 and to determine which variables play a significant role, i.e., cause changes 
in CAR, we used CAR as the dependent variable and ran a multiple linear regression model with the 
control variables industry, size and measure. The independent variables are incident and status: As 
stated above, status refers to whether the announcement is intended or actual, and incident refers 
to whether the announcement was before or after the fundamental security incident in the 
particular industry.  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 =
𝛼 + 𝛽1 (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙)𝑖 +  𝛽2 (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠)𝑖 + 𝛾1 (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚)𝑖 +
               𝛾2 (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙)𝑖 + 𝛿1 (𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛)𝑖 + 𝛿2 (𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙)𝑖 +
              𝜁(𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑖 + 𝜂(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠)𝑖 +  𝜖𝑖 .         (5) 
Accordingly, industry refers to the industry sector (retail, service or financial), size refers to the firm 
size (small, medium or large), and measure refers to the security measure the firm announces to 
Event Study on the Impact of Information Security Investment Announcements 
 
Frei verwendbar  16 
 
invest in (human, technological or certification). The parameters in the linear regression model 
were estimated using OLS. With the linear regression we show that the variables industry, size and 
measure do not influence the stock market return and therefore do not need to be considered 
when testing the hypotheses. In contrast, we show that the variables status and incident have 
significant effects on the stock market return.  
To test hypotheses H1-H4, we split the data into subsamples corresponding to the criteria 
regarding timing (Bose & Leung, 2013; Chatterjee & Carl Pacini, 2002; Im et al., 2001), i.e., 
depending on the dimensions before and after the fundamental security incident in the particular 
industry and intended and actual information security investment announcements. This approach 
yields four subsamples, as shown in Table 6. For each hypothesis, we compare two of the 
subsamples against one another (cf. Table 6): We computed CAR for each subsample and applied 
two-sample t-tests, which are one of the most commonly used hypothesis tests and was already 
used in previous event studies (Agrawal & Kamakura, 1995; Swanson, 2011). In order to check for 
robustness, we repeated the analysis for a different discrete event window 𝑇 = [−2,2], as done in 
previous event studies (Bose & Leung, 2013; Subramani & Walden, 2001).  
5. Results 
With regressing CAR we first examine the relationship between the CAR and event characteristics 
as described in the previous section. Thereafter, we test the statistical significance of differences in 
CAR for the subsamples corresponding to the four hypotheses H1-H4.  
The results of the multiple linear regression (5) can be found in Table 5. The assumptions for OLS 
are satisfied3. The variables status and incident are significant in both event windows (0.065 and 
                                                          
3
 The assumptions “linearity in parameters” and “random sampling” are satisfied. Moreover, the expected value 
of the error term is zero, i.e.,  𝐸(𝜖𝑖) = 0 for all 𝑖 because there is no relationship between the parameters and the 
error terms 𝜖𝑖. In order to proof that there is no multi-collinearity we showed that there is no linear relationship 
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0.042 in 𝑡 = [−1,1], and 0.077 and 0.022 in 𝑡 = [−2,2]), i.e., changes in these variables are related 
to changes in CAR. Accordingly, we split the whole sample in subsamples corresponding to the 
variables status and incident. With p-values ranging from 0.361 to 0.821 in 𝑡 = [−1,1] and from 
0.105 to 0.953 in 𝑡 = [−2,2], all control variables (firm industry, size and measure) were not 
significant in both event windows, which indicates that the abnormal returns corresponding to the 
announcements were not influenced by a firm's industry, size and the security measure that the 
firm invested in. Therefore, we do not consider the variables industry, size and measure in the 
following hypothesis tests.  
Table 5 Regression Results 
 𝑇 = [−1,1] 𝑇 = [−2,2] 
 Coefficient t-score p-value Coefficient t-score p-value 
Status (𝜂) -0.07343 -1.889 0.065 -0.03309 -1.814 0.077 
Incident (𝜁) -0.02327 -1.365 0.042 -0.04325 -1.274 0.022 
Control 
variable 
Industry 
- Retail (𝛽1) 
- Services (𝛽2) 
 
-0.03804 
0.01366 
 
-0.922 
0.746 
 
0.361 
0.459 
 
0.00211 
0.02596 
 
0.059 
1.656 
 
0.953 
0.105 
Size 
-medium (𝛾1) 
-small (𝛾2) 
 
-0.01531 
0.00425 
 
-0.879 
0.227 
0.384 
0.821 
 
0.00314 
-0.01703 
 
0.211 
-1.061 
0.834 
0.295 
Measure 
-human (𝛿1) 
-technologic (𝛿2) 
 
0.00998 
-0.02354 
 
0.494 
-1.105 
0.624 
0.275 
 
0.00481 
-0.00639 
 
0.278 
-0.416 
0.782 
0.679 
The changes in stock prices for the subsamples and the results of the two-sample one-sided t-test 
by means of the T-score and its significance levels are shown in Table 6 and discussed in Section 6. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
between the independent variables: We calculated the Pearson correlation coefficient in order to measure the 
correlation between two independent variables status and incident. For the computation we binary coded 
intended as 0 and actual information security investment announcements as 1. Announcements before the 
incident were coded as 1 and announcements after as 0. The correlation coefficient was found to be 0.069 and 
below the threshold level of 0.7. Therefore, there is no multi-collinearity. The last assumption we need to show is 
that there is homoscedasticity: To test whether the variance of the errors is constant we performed three tests, 
namely White test, Breusch-Godfrey test and Goldfeld-Quandt test. Heteroscedasticity was not detected. 
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The assumptions for the t-tests are satisfied4. The results indicate that the null hypothesis is 
rejected for H2-H4, i.e., we found evidence that hypotheses H2-H4 are supported.  
Table 6 Impact of Information Security Investment Announcements Subsamples on Return of Stock Prizes 
 CAR (in %), SD T-score 
𝑇 = [−1,1] 𝑇 = [−2,2] 𝑇 = [−1,1] 𝑇 = [−2,2] 
Panel A: Before fundamental security incident (n=49) 
H1 
actual (n=33) -1.8, 0.124 -0.1, 0.134 0.0919 
(p=0.46) 
0.8358 
(p=0.20) intended (n=16) -1.5, 0.040 -3.3, 0.060 
Panel B: After fundamental security incident (n=14) 
H2 
actual (n=8) 2.1, 0.120 2.6, 0.119 2.0952** 
(p=0.03) 
2.4227** 
(p=0.02) intended (n=6) 0.7, 0.043 -0.1, 0.070 
Panel C: Intended information security investment (n=22) 
H3 
after incident (n=6) 0.7, 0.043 -0.1, 0.070 2.5596*** 
(p=0.01) 
2.2722** 
(p=0.02) before incident (n=16) -1.5, 0.040 -3.3, 0.060 
Panel D: Actual information security investment (n=41) 
H4 
after incident (n=8) 2.1, 0.120 2.6, 0.119 2.9832*** 
(p=0.002) 
1.8241** 
(p=0.04) before incident (n=33) -1.8, 0.124 -0.1, 0.134 
The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively using a one-tail test. n is the 
number of announcements in the subsample. SD refers to the standard deviation. 
6. Discussion of Results 
In the following we discuss the results of the four hypotheses as presented in Table 6 in detail. 
Thereafter, the research questions RQ1 and RQ2 introduced in Section 1 are discussed and 
answered. 
6.1. Discussion of the Hypotheses 
6.1.1. Stock Price Reaction of Actual and Intended Information Security Investment 
Announcements Before Fundamental Security Incidents 
                                                          
4
 The assumption “independent samples” is satisfied. We used the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to determine that 
the data is normally distributed. Moreover, the two samples have the same variance for each hypothesis: We ran 
the Levene’s test for equality of variances and received p-values of 0.64, 0.07, 0.21 and 0.71 for the subsamples 
corresponding to hypotheses H1-H4 as given in Table 6. Therefore, the subsample variances can be treated as 
equal.  
Event Study on the Impact of Information Security Investment Announcements 
 
Frei verwendbar  19 
 
Surprisingly, we did not detect a different stock market reaction for actual (-1.8% in 𝑇 = [−1,1] 
and -0.1% in 𝑇 = [−2,2]) and intended (-1.5% in 𝑇 = [−1,1] and -3.3% in 𝑇 = [−2,2]) information 
security investment announcements before fundamental security incidents (cf. Panel A of Table 6). 
The results of the t-test showed that the differences of intended and actual information security 
investment announcement are not significant and could have happened by chance. The null 
hypothesis is not rejected, as the type II error was 𝛽 = 0.46 in 𝑇 = [−1,1] and 𝛽 = 0.20 in 
𝑇 = [−2,2]. Overall, hypothesis H1 is not supported by our results.  
Accordingly, before fundamental security incidents investors do not distinguish between intended 
and actual information security investment announcements. Before fundamental security 
incidents, they might not consider information security as worthy to invest in (Kankanhalli et al., 
2003), and therefore they react similarly negative to both intended and actual information security 
investment announcements. Comparing the negative mean CARs with those of Chai et al. (2011) 
we notice that we obtain highly negative CARs in our study: The lowest CAR value regarding stock 
market reaction to information security investment announcements was -0.63% in Chai et al. 
(2011). We conclude that investors harshly punish intended information security investments 
before fundamental security incidents. 
6.1.2. Stock Price Reaction of Actual and Intended Information Security Investment 
Announcements After Fundamental Security Incidents  
In line with our expectations, the data analysis showed that investors react more positively to firms 
announcing actual information security investments than to organizations announcing intended 
investments after fundamental security incidents in the corresponding industry. After fundamental 
security incidents, actual information security investments clearly show high CARs in both event 
windows (2.1% in 𝑇 = [−1,1] and 2.6% in 𝑇 = [−2,2]). Moreover, the results indicate that the 
CARs of actual information security investments are significantly higher than those of intended 
investments. This result is statistically significant in both event windows (𝑝 < 0.05 for both 
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𝑇 = [−1,1] and  𝑇 = [−2,2]), as can be seen in Panel B of Table 6. The average CARs for actual 
information security investments are higher than those for intended investments (0.7% in 
𝑇 = [−1,1] and -0.1% in 𝑇 = [−2,2]). Although the sample size was small, this study provides 
evidence that the stock market rewards companies’ actual investments in information security 
after fundamental security incidents. The results, as shown in Panel B of Table 6, indicate that 
hypothesis H2 can be statistically confirmed. 
This outcome reflects our assumption: Investors expect that actual information security 
investments result in increased revenue for the investing organization, as opposed to intended 
information security investments. Intended information security investments have yet to be 
implemented in the firm and can therefore not result in a higher security level. We assume that the 
fundamental information security incident in the particular industry causes the stock market 
investors to rethink the necessity of information security and raises awareness. Since hypothesis 
H1 could not be supported, i.e., before fundamental security incidents there is no significant 
difference between intended and actual information security investment announcements, 
fundamental security incidents cause a considerable change in the attitude of investors towards 
information security. In line with our assumption, the highest CAR can be expected when actually 
investing after a fundamental information security incident (2.6% in 𝑇 = [−2,2]). Comparing the 
CARs of our study with those of we notice that our CAR values are relatively low: Chai et al. (2011) 
obtain significant mean CAR values up to 4.49% resulting from information security investments 
which are announced after the enactment of SOX. Therefore, the observed changes in the stock 
market due to fundamental security incidents are comparatively small. A reason for these 
comparatively small values might be that we examine the stock market reactions of firms which are 
not directly affected by fundamental security incidents, but instead are in the same industry sector 
as the firm experiencing a breach. Moreover, we observe that the CAR value of actual information 
security investments remains rather stable over time (2.1% in in 𝑇 = [−1,1] and 2.6% in in 
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𝑇 = [−2,2]), whereas the value for intended information security investments strongly decreases 
(0.7% in in 𝑇 = [−1,1] and -0.1% in in 𝑇 = [−2,2]). We assume that, after fundamental security 
incidents, a firm’s promise to invest in information security in the future is insufficient in the long 
term for investors whose security awareness has increased because of the incident: Investors 
appreciate the investment announcements at first but call for actual investments taking a long-
term perspective. Return for actual investments remains stable because investors know that a 
firm’s early investment in information security will increase the level of security within the 
organization in the long term.  
6.1.3. Stock Price Reaction of Intended Information Security Investment Announcements Before 
and After Fundamental Security Incidents  
As expected, regarding the percentage change in CAR, the gain for intended information security 
investments after fundamental security incidents in the respective industry is higher than the gain 
before an incident. Results shown in Panel C of Table 6 proof that, before the incident, highly 
negative returns for intended investments take place (-1.5% in 𝑇 = [−1,1] and -3.3% in 𝑇 =
[−2,2]). Overall, hypothesis H3 is supported.  
As discussed in Kankanhalli et al. (2003), investors might think that the risk of information security 
breaches is low and therefore see no use in investing in information security. Moreover, due to the 
difficulty of evaluating the benefits, they might be sceptical about information security 
effectiveness (Kankanhalli et al., 2003) and would have preferred investments in other business 
sectors, possibly resulting in increased revenues. We conclude that the fundamental security 
incident causes investors to acknowledge a firms’ willingness to invest in information security even 
though the investment has not yet been made while being intended in the future. As predicted, 
firms’ uncertain promises to improve their information security in the future are rewarded by 
investors after fundamental security incidents. The impact of information security incidents has 
been analysed from different perspectives: while the effect was negative for the breached firm 
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(Acquisti et al., 2006; Campbell et al., 2003; Garg et al., 2003) and positive for its non-breached 
competitors (Jeong et al., 2016; Zafar et al., 2012), we found that firms from the same industry as 
the breached firm can benefit from the breach by announcing to implement information security 
countermeasures in the future. We observe that the mean CARs are distinctively smaller in 
𝑇 = [−2,2] compared to 𝑇 = [−1,1]. A reason for this might be investors awaiting another 
announcement claiming the promised information security measure has been implemented on day 
𝑡 = 2 and react negatively if there is no such announcement. After a fundamental information 
security incident, the stock market return even shifts from positive (0.7% in 𝑇 = [−1,1]) to 
negative (-0.1% in 𝑇 = [−2,2]) because information security has moved to the centre of investors’ 
attention, and therefore investors punish those firms that do not keep their information security 
promises.  
6.1.4. Stock Price Reaction of Actual Information Security Investment Announcements Before 
and After Fundamental Security Incidents  
Panel D in Table 6 shows that, for actual information security investments, we observed positive 
abnormal returns after the fundamental security incident in both event windows (2.1% in 
𝑇 = [−1,1] and 2.6% in 𝑇 = [−2,2]). For actual information security investments, the results 
indicate that the CARs are significantly higher after a fundamental security incident in the 
particular industry than before in both event windows (𝑝 < 0.01 for 𝑇 = [−1,1] and 𝑝 < 0.05 for 
𝑇 = [−2,2]). Before the incident, CARs are negative (-1.8% in 𝑇 = [−1,1] and -0.1% in 𝑇 =
[−2,2]). Overall, hypothesis H4 is supported.  
This supports the assumption that fundamental security incidents in a certain industry shift 
investors’ attitude towards information security in that industry: Before the incident investors do 
not approve spending money on information security because the necessity of information security 
is not recognized. After the incident the importance of information security in the corresponding 
industry is acknowledged. Since the investments are already implemented up to the time of 
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announcement, the investors are sure of the immediate increased security level of the announcing 
firm and reward it with higher CARs after an incident than before. The CAR in 𝑇 = [−2,2] is even 
higher than in 𝑇 = [−1,1] for investment announcements after incidents. We assume that the CAR 
increases two days after an incident because it may take two days to fully assess the severity of the 
damage caused by the fundamental security incident. When having fully realized the impact and 
seriousness of the incident, investors reward firms that aim at improving their security with even 
higher CARs than in 𝑇 = [−1,1]. The conclusion that information security-related events impact 
the stock market returns regarding information security investments has already been drawn: After 
the enactment of SOX, the returns for information security investment announcements were 
significantly higher than before (Chai et al., 2011). We postulate that not only legislative efforts but 
also fundamental incidents increase information security awareness among investors and increase 
stock market returns of information security investment announcements.  
In Table 7, we summarized the results of the discussion for each hypothesis.  
Table 7 Summary of the Results for Hypotheses H1 - H4 
Hypothesis  Result 
H1 Before fundamental security incidents, the stock price will react more 
positively to a firm’s announcement of actual information security 
investments than to announcements of the intention to invest. 
not supported  
H2 After fundamental security incidents, the stock price will react more 
positively to a firm’s announcement of actual information security 
investments than to announcements of the intention to invest. 
supported 
H3 The stock price will react more positively to a firm’s announcements 
of the intention to invest after the fundamental security incident 
compared to before.  
supported 
H4 The stock price will react more positively to a firm’s announcements 
of actual information security investments after the fundamental 
security incident compared to before. 
supported 
 
6.2. Discussion of the Research Questions 
6.2.1. Stock Price Reactions of Intended and Actual Information Security Investment 
Announcements  
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Our analysis shows that market reactions for intended and actual information security investment 
announcements are negative before fundamental security incidents, i.e., the stock market 
punishes both intended and actual information security investments before incidents in a given 
industry. Moreover, intended information security investments generate highly negative stock 
market reactions before fundamental security incidents; however, there is no significant difference 
between actual and intended information security investments before fundamental incidents. The 
reason for this might be that information security investments are perceived to be big cost items 
without benefits. After a fundamental information security incident the situation changes. The 
status of investments, intended or actual, now plays a major role: In line with our expectations, the 
CARs of actual information security investments are significantly higher than those of intended 
investments after fundamental security incidents. We assume that the fundamental security 
incident causes investors to rethink the necessity of actual information security investments. The 
market rewards actual information security investments more generously and stock market 
investors expect greater benefits from actual information security investment than from intended 
investments. As intended information security investment announcements often generate negative 
abnormal stock returns (cf. Panel C in Table 6), we assume that investors disbelieve that the firm 
will keep its promises and implement the assured security countermeasures in the future. Another 
reason for the negative reaction to intended information security investment announcements 
could be that the announcing firm points out to the investors that the promised security 
countermeasure is not yet implemented within the organization, i.e., the current security level 
needs improvement. Therefore, the investors realize that the announcing firm is not sufficiently 
protected against security breaches. However, when regarding the temporal evolvement of the 
stock market reaction, i.e. regarding a slightly larger time frame, we observe instability of the stock 
market returns. Accordingly, no sustainable effects are caused: For all intended investments, 
whether before or after security incidents, the CAR value is always smaller in 𝑇 = [−2,2] than in 
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𝑇 = [−1,1]. We assume that investors expect another announcement that the promised 
information security measure has been implemented on day 𝑡 = 2 and react negatively if there is 
no such announcement. Accordingly, intended information security investment announcements 
lead to a short term rise in market returns, though quickly subsiding. 
 
6.2.2. Stock Price Reactions of Information Security Investment Announcements Before and After 
Fundamental Security Incidents 
For the question how a firm’s announcement of an information security investment influences the 
firm’s stock market value before a fundamental security incident and after the incident, the results 
show that the fundamental incident influences the market reaction on information security 
investment announcements: Corresponding to our expectations, after the incidents, the CARs are 
distinctively higher than those before the incident (cf. Panel A and Panel B in Table 6), as the 
market rewards firms that try to improve their information security to prevent security incidents. 
Surprisingly, before the fundamental incidents the abnormal returns are negative and insignificant. 
After fundamental security incidents, the return for information security investment 
announcements, whether intended or actual, is positive and notably higher than for 
announcements before the incident, in which case negative CARs are returned. We assume that, 
before fundamental incidents, investors do not recognize the necessity of information security 
investments, since they do not generate direct profit for the firm and they would prefer 
investments in more profitable business sectors instead: This may be why information security 
investments lead to negative CARs and therefore do not cause improvements of the organization’s 
performance. This claim is backed up by academic literature: information security investments 
might not improve a firm’s stock return (Chai et al., 2011; Dos Santos et al., 1993; Im et al., 2001). 
Those negative market reactions could be caused by investors’ negative opinions or doubts about a 
firm’s resource allocation or about its investment priority (Chai et al., 2011); i.e., investors may 
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regard the investment in information security as superfluous. After fundamental security incidents 
in the respective industry, investors realize the importance of information security and believe that 
organizations investing in information security will improve their profit, reputation and popularity 
with customers. CAR values for actual information security investments after security incidents are 
lower in  𝑇 = [−1,1] than in  𝑇 = [−2,2] (cf. Panel B in Table 6). 
However, as increased information security awareness is often limited in time (Allam, Flowerday, & 
Flowerday, 2014; Kruger & Kearney, 2006), we assume that this rise in investors’ information 
security awareness is only temporary, has its peak instantly after the incident and decreases 
thereafter. Accordingly, there remains a need for research as to how investors’ awareness evolves 
in the long term when more than one security incident in one industry sector is regarded. For 
future research, we recommend the development of approaches on how to raise stock market 
investors’ security awareness so that they acknowledge firms’ willingness to improve their 
information security not only after fundamental security incidents have occured. 
6.3. Managerial Implications 
For practitioners, this study provides useful insights and a true reflection on the return of 
information security investments: When an organization decides to invest in information security, 
it should take into consideration that actual information security investment announcements 
generate higher abnormal returns that intended ones. Thus, the organizations should wait to 
announce the investment until the information security measure has been implemented. Although 
intended information security investment announcements generate short-term increase of the 
stock market return, this return is rapidly decreasing. In contrast, actual information security 
investment announcements cause high abnormal return which are instable over time. Accordingly, 
we recommend organizations to announce the actual investment in information security 
countermeasures and not the intention to invest.   
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Moreover, organizations should take into account that the stock market investors’ interest in 
information security increases after a fundamental security incident in their industry. Accordingly, 
firms can expect a highly positive abnormal return if they announce their security investments after 
incidents and can therefore benefit from fundamental security incidents in their industry. As a 
matter of course, firms might not be able to foresee fundamental information security incidents in 
their industry. Moreover, the line between “after incident A” and “before incident B” when 
regarding two incidents A and B in the same industry is blurry; put differently, organizations do not 
know whether they invest after the last incident or before the next one. For future work, we advise 
to study the stock market reaction of investing firms regarding two incidents in the same industry 
and to examine the line between “after incident A” and “before incident B”.  
Overall, the following guidelines can be derived: Firms should not announce their intention to 
invest before a fundamental security incident since this results in the lowest expected CAR. The 
highest CAR can be expected with actual investments after a fundamental information security 
incident in the respective industry.  
7. Conclusion  
This study provides evidence in support of the influence of information security investment 
announcements on an investing firm’s market value. As described in the introduction, we regard 
timing in two dimensions, namely the time of announcement in relation to the time of investment 
and the time of announcement in relation to the time of a fundamental security incident. With 
reference to our research questions, we found that both dimensions influence the stock market 
return of an investing organization: Actual information security investments trigger a more positive 
stock market reaction after fundamental security incidents than intended investments. The return 
of actual information security investments is unstable and increasing one day after an incident, 
whereas the return of intended investments is decreasing. Moreover, we conclude that 
fundamental information security incidents in a particular industry increase the awareness of the 
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importance of information security and arouse attention to information security investment 
announcements of firms in the respective industry. Our study shows that the stock market return 
of information security investment is often negative before fundamental security incidents. 
However, after an incident, we observe positive stock return for the investing organization.  
The limitations of this study are related to the collected data: As we gathered the public 
information security investment announcements from newspapers, relevant information such as 
the amount of investment could not be included in our analysis. We assume that the amount of 
invested capital plays an important role on stock price returns: Investors might reward 
organizations that spend comparatively large sums with higher abnormal stock price returns than 
firms investing smaller sums or firms not investing at all. Furthermore, a larger sample size may 
improve the robustness of the results. Due to our screening process and our requirements on the 
data, we had to filter out a large portion of the announcements. With 63 information security 
investment announcements, we regard a relatively small size compared to, for instance, Brock & 
Levy (2013) and Chai et al. (2011). Nevertheless, since the results have been validated by a 
statistical t-test conducted in two different event windows, the reliability of our findings is assured. 
In this study, we differentiated between intended and actual information security investment 
announcements but did not consider the effects of the information security investments whose 
intention to invest has been pre-announced5. The reason for this is that firms do not announce 
actual investments if they have already (pre-)announced their intention to invest. Therefore, we 
were not able to assess the precise date of the pre-announced investment from the Lexis/Nexis 
Academic Database. Future research in the area of intended and actual information security 
investments should include the effects of pre-announced and subsequently undertaken 
investments, i.e., distinguish and compare the effects of intention announcements with the effects 
                                                          
5
 Assuming that the organization does keep its promise and implement the pre-announced information security 
investment.  
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of the priory promised investment to the actual investment announcement. Moreover, academic 
research should study the implications of firms not keeping their promises to invest in information 
security even if they have already announced their intention to invest. Such research would benefit 
practitioners with answering the question which strategy to pursue when it comes to information 
security investment announcements, i.e., which order of actions is the most profitable.    
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